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I. Introduction
No character in a Socratic dialogue is as boring as a yes-man.
It is with regret, then, that I confess to general agreement with
Professor Calhoun’s address. Although I cannot repay my
invitation to write this response by challenging Calhoun, however,
I believe I can do so by approaching the subject of his address from
a different angle.
Although Professor Calhoun and I are both Christians,
Calhoun’s talk was structured so as to be of roughly equal
relevance to any religious tradition. At the same time, Calhoun’s
survey of history was focused solely on the United States, and
therefore on the political controversies of the last few centuries. To
complement Calhoun’s address, I propose to narrow the scope of
the discussion to Christianity and, in addition, broaden it to
encompass two millennia of church-state relations and first
principles of political morality.

J.D., 2018, Washington and Lee University School of Law. Huyett was the 2018
President of Washington and Lee’s chapter of the Christian Legal Society. His
paper “‘As I Had Mercy on You’: Karla Faye Tucker, Immanuel Kant, and the
Impossibility of Christian Retributivism” was published in the Summer 2018
issue of Religio et Lex.
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I approach the topic this way for two reasons: first, because I
see the universal Christian church as a single body extended
through time, and, second, because Christianity is a worldview
which speaks to every area of human existence. Christians believe
that Christ established a kingdom which “shall never be
destroyed . . . it shall stand forever.” 1 Likewise, all of human life
must be centered upon God, for “from him and through him and to
him are all things.” 2 I am therefore concerned with the questions
of what influence the church has had on public policy over the
course of its whole existence—and whether any competing set of
principles can hope to challenge Christian belief.
One of the most compelling themes of Professor Calhoun’s
address was that a religiously informed political philosophy can,
and should be, appealing on its face. Does the application of
religion to politics, Calhoun asked the audience, “enrich our
democracy or harm it?” 3 Through his historical examples—which
focused on the evangelical roots of abolitionism—Calhoun showed
that a comprehensive Christian ethic is not only rational, but
desirable. For instance, Calhoun asked the audience whether New
England clergy should have refrained from condemning the
expansion of slavery as a great moral wrong. 4
Calhoun’s question suggests two arguments. First, it would be
illogical for Christians to believe that slavery is a sin but remain
silent about its practice—or to conceal their religious motives in
opposing it. Second, unless one supports slavery, then it would be
odd to suggest that William Wilberforce should have preferred to
remain quiet rather than root his abolitionism in his Christian
faith. 5 I will underscore Calhoun’s point by showing that, for
1. Daniel 2:44.
2. Romans 11:36.
3. Samuel W. Calhoun, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln,
and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to
Separate Religion from Politics, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 459, 488 (2018).
4. Id. at 488
5. William Wilberforce was a prominent and successful evangelical
abolitionist in Britain. See History: William Wilberforce (1759–1833), BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/wilberforce_william.shtml
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2018) (“Wilberforce was a deeply religious English member of
parliament and social reformer who was very influential in the abolition of the
slave trade and eventually slavery itself in the British empire.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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thousands of years, Christians have advanced human liberty
through the explicit application of their faith to politics and law. A
handful of examples, taken from various eras of church history,
will illustrate my point.

II. Religion and Politics Throughout History
In 390 AD, during the
Christian era of the Roman
Empire, the Emperor Theodosius
responded to an uprising in
Thessalonica by rashly ordering a
massacre of the population. 6
“Multitudes were mowed down
like ears of grain in harvest-tide,”
wrote the historian Theodoret; “It
is said that seven thousand
perished.” 7 At the time, Aurelius
“Ambrose” Ambrosius, Archbishop
of Milan—known today as the
mentor of Augustine—was the
Saint Ambrose barring Theodosius from
most prominent leader of the
Milan Cathedral, A. van Dyck, 1619–1620
church. 8 When Theodosius went
to the cathedral at Milan to receive communion, Ambrose
protested the massacre by personally blocking the emperor from
entering 9—an event that has been powerfully illustrated by
Anthony van Dyck. 10
Ambrose was driven by his belief in the sovereignty of God—
and the dependence and fallenness of all human beings. Though
Theodosius was wearing purple robes, Ambrose reasoned, his
6. Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History (Book V) 5.17, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/27025.htm (last visited on Aug. 23, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Id. at 5.17.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Anthony van Dyck, Saint Ambrose barring Theodosius from Milan
Cathedral (1619–1620).

CHURCH HISTORY, LIBERTY & POLITICAL MORALITY 549
clothes adorned a body made of dust. 11 “You are a sovereign, Sir,
of men of like nature with your own, and who are in truth your
fellow slaves,” argued Ambrose, “for there is one Lord and
Sovereign of mankind, Creator of the Universe.” 12 At Christmas,
Theodosius again attempted to enter the cathedral—this time at
the urging of his chief of staff, Rufinus. In response, Ambrose
denounced both men to their faces, telling Rufinus that “your
impudence matches a dog’s” and calling Theodosius a “tyrant.” 13
“You are raging against God,” he told Theodosius, “you are
trampling on his laws.” 14 In order to gain admittance, Theodosius
was forced to declare a suspension of capital punishment for thirty
days and to prostrate himself on the ground. 15 Using the words of
King David, Theodosius prayed “[m]y soul cleaves unto the dust,
quicken thou me according to your word.” 16
The paradox behind the Emperor’s prayer—that a man might
rule the world and yet be a penitent vassal—was a notion
unparalleled in imperial history. The idea of the supreme emperor
had survived the unchecked depravities and massacres of Caligula,
Caracalla, and Diocletian. It must have been wondrous to behold
an Emperor bowed by the mere spiritual authority of a bishop—a
man who cannot have been armed with anything more than a
crosier and a choir. Even so, Ambrose wrote of the incident that “I
have preferred to be somewhat wanting in duty rather than in
humility” 17—suggesting that, if he had been a more dutiful
Christian, he would have been even more zealous in his defiance.
This otherworldly fury and force is exactly what we would expect
to see if Christianity is true: a suggestion that, in the church, God
had ignited a singular fire in the midst of human affairs.

11. See Ecclesiastical History, supra note 6, at 5.17 (“We must not because
we are dazzled by the sheen of the purple fail to see the weakness of the body that
it robes.”).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; Cf. Psalm 119:25.
17. Ambrose,
Epistles
51,
NEW
ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/340951.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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As if answering Professor Calhoun’s address directly, Ambrose
explained his actions in a letter. Having heard of the massacre, he
could not “close [his] ears with wax.” 18 “Should I keep silence?,”
Ambrose asked. 19 “But then my conscience would be bound, my
utterance taken away, which would be the most wretched condition
of all.” 20 Ambrose then cited Ezekiel 3:18, which reads “If I [God]
say to the wicked, ‘You shall surely die,’ and you give him no
warning . . . that wicked person shall die for his iniquity, but his
blood I will require at your hand.” 21
Although the Roman Empire eventually fell, the church—and
its power to subdue oppressive rulers—did not. In G.K.
Chesterton’s words, once the ship of Europe had sunk, it soon
“came up again: repainted and glittering, with the cross still at the
top.” 22 Nor did Christian political influence remain limited to
rulers as conscientious as Theodosius.
Even the Frankish Queen Fredegund—known for
assassinating several of her own family members and trying to
murder her daughter with her bare hands 23—was susceptible to its
power. In 580 AD, Fredegund’s sons fell ill and died. 24 Believing
that God was punishing her for her cruelty, Fredegund gathered
up and burned the registers she had used to assess crippling taxes
against the poor. 25 According to historian Paul Freedman, the
Frankish royals believed that “the poor, the widow, the orphans—
the people that they have oppressed—have a kind of power of
vengeance by mobilizing this supernatural force.” 26 Fredegund
then convinced her husband, Chilperic, that God would give them

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Ezekiel 3:18.
22. G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 212–213 (Catholic Answers ed. 2014)
(1908).
23. JANA K. SCHULMAN, THE RISE OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 500–1300: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 146 (2002).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Paul
Freedman,
Lecture
11—Frankish
Society,
YALE U.,
https://oyc.yale.edu/history/hist-210/lecture-11 (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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a new son if he stopped assessing new taxes. 27 Chilperic complied,
and Fredegund gave birth to a future king, Clothar the Great. 28
Fredegund’s repentance differs from the Emperor’s not only
because of her greater fondness for killing, but because—so far as
I know—Fredegund did not have an Ambrose to correct her. In the
darkness of Fredegund’s tragedy, Christianity itself may have
stood as her strange and surprising conscience—speaking for the
voiceless even without a living voice to proclaim it. Certainly, there
are countless verses in the Bible that may have moved her—too
many to list them all here. Yet it is hard not to imagine that
Fredegund had in mind the words of the prophet Amos: “Therefore
because you trample on the poor and you exact taxes of grain from
him, you have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell
in them; you have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not
drink their wine.” 29
We can see that the
church’s power influenced a
wide range of rulers. Perhaps
no medieval Christian ruler
has commanded so much
attention as Charlemagne.
Crowned Holy Roman Emperor
in 800 AD, Charlemagne
single-handedly
created
a
superstate that promised to
reunify
Europe—an
achievement that would not be
rivaled
until
Napoleon’s
conquests one thousand years
later. Like Theodosius before
Stained glass window depicting the him, Charlemagne was capable
both
thoughtful
friendship of Charlemagne and Alcuin, of
introspection
and
rash
Lafayette College.
violence. On the one hand,
Charlemagne favored decentralized power, promoted education,
and encouraged care for the poor. On the other hand, he sometimes
27.
28.
29.

SCHULMAN, supra note 23, at 146.
Id.
Amos 5:11.
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fell short of his own ethics—as when he forced the pagan Saxons
to convert at the point of a sword. 30 When this happened, however,
the church—once again—was ready to admonish and restrain the
coercive use of governmental authority. 31 Alcuin, the foremost
Christian thinker of his age and a close associate of Charlemagne,
demanded an end to forced conversions. “Faith arises from the will,
not from compulsion,” he wrote. 32 “You can persuade a man to
believe, but you cannot force him. You may even be able to force
him to be baptized, but this will not help to instill the faith within
him.” 33
The powerful example of Ambrose illuminated even the High
Middle Ages. In 1075, one of Charlemagne’s successors—the Holy
Roman Emperor Henry IV—resisted a push to end government
control of internal church appointments. 34 Pope Gregory VII
responded by excommunicating Henry IV in 1076. 35 In defending
the excommunication, Gregory cited Ezekiel 3:18—the same verse
cited by Ambrose almost 700 years earlier. 36 This
30. See Thomas Shahan & Ewan Macpherson, Charlemagne, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03610c.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018)
(“Education, for aspirants to the priesthood at least, was furthered by the royal
order of 787 to all bishops and abbots to keep open in their cathedrals and
monasteries schools for the study of the seven liberal arts and the interpretation
of Scriptures.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See id. (“At any rate, the ‘Saxon Capitulary’ . . . of 781 obliged all Saxons
not only to accept baptism (and this on the pain of death) . . . .”).
32. Alcuin: “Epistles 110, 113” on Faith by Will, Not Compulsion (765 CE),
GEO. U. BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS,
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/alcuin-epistles-110-113-on-faith-bywill-not-compulsion-765-ce (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Id.
34. See
Conflict
of
Investitures,
NEW
ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2018)
(“Ignoring the prohibition of Gregory, as also the latter’s effort at a mitigation of
the same, Henry continued to appoint bishops in Germany and in Italy.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. See Klemens Löffler, Conflict of Investitures, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm (“At the next Lenten Synod in
Rome (1076) Gregory sat in judgment upon the king, and in a prayer to Peter,
Prince of the Apostles, declared: ‘I depose him from the government of the whole
Kingdom of Germany and Italy, release all Christians from their oath of
allegiance, forbid him to be obeyed as king . . . and as thy successor bind him with
the fetters of anathema.’”)
36. EPHRAIM EMERTON, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF POPE GREGORY VII:
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excommunication proved so debilitating that, in the famous “Road
to Canossa” incident, Henry IV personally traveled to Italy to beg
Gregory’s forgiveness, accompanied by only a few bodyguards. 37 In
a gesture that should seem familiar, Henry waited outside the
fortress at Canossa, barefoot and dressed in sackcloth, for three
days. Gregory, satisfied with his repentance, invited Henry inside
and received him back into the church. 38
From the standpoint of our age, when it is often believed that
separating church and state means separating religion and
politics, the story of Canossa is particularly ironic. It was precisely
Gregory’s Christian conception of politics that motivated him to
protect the church from state interference—and, in doing so, serve
as the state’s conscience.
From these examples, we can see that many of the of church’s
humane achievements now stand unacknowledged. Likewise, the
church opposed many of the abuses that are now usually
misattributed to it. The Spanish conquest of the Americas, for
example, is often thought to have been driven as much by
evangelical fervor as by greed. In reality, it was church leaders—
especially the Dominicans—who were the foremost critics of
Spanish atrocities against American Indians. 39
In 1550, the Dominican reformer Bartolomé de las Casas
successfully persuaded the Holy Roman Emperor to put his
conquests on hold pending the outcome of a theological debate in
SELECTED LETTERS FROM THE REGISTRUM 101 (1932).
37. Conflict
of
Investitures,
NEW
ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08084c.htm
He was finally admitted to the papal presence, and pledged himself to
recognize the mediation and decision of the pope in the quarrel with
the princes, and was then freed from excommunication (January,
1077). This famous event has been countless times described, and from
very divergent points of view. Through Bismarck, Canossa became a
proverbial term to indicate the humiliation of the civil power before the
ambitious and masterful Church.
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
38. PATRICK J. GEARY, READINGS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY 572 (4th ed. 1974).
39. Paolo G. Carozza, From Conquest to Constitutions: Retrieving a Latin
American Tradition of the Idea of Human Rights, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 281, 290
(2003),
https://www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2005/397U/
Readings%20Legal%20397U/4%20Paolo%20Carozza.pdf (“At the time, the
foremost critics of Spanish brutality in the Indies were the friars of the Order of
Preachers (also known as Dominicans, after their founder St. Dominic.)”).
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the Council of the Indies. 40 The historian Lewis Hanke writes that
“[p]robably never before or since has a mighty emperor . . . ordered
his conquests to cease until it was decided if they were just.” 41
Casas’ example is so striking, in fact, that some have attempted to
detach him from church history and reimagine him as a secular
Enlightenment thinker. Although Casas believed himself to be
propounding the traditional Christian position, the argument goes,
he was in fact preempting Rousseau. 42 This position demonstrates
a dismissive ignorance of the church history already discussed. In
appealing to Christianity to oppose imperialism, Casas was
walking a millennia-old path already trodden—in the classical and
middle ages—by Ambrose and Alcuin. It is far less likely that
Casas was a closet secularist than that he was influenced by a
savior who said “I came to cast fire on the earth, and would that it
were already kindled.” 43
As Professor Calhoun has
already discussed the role of
Christianity in the abolitionist
movement, I will conclude my
list with a contemporary
example. In 2014, Congress
established
the
bipartisan
Charles Colson Task Force on
Federal Corrections, 44 which
recommended, among other
things, increasing the safety of
American prisons in order to
promote rehabilitation. 45 The
name of the task force was
fitting, as Charles Colson, until
Charles Colson ministering to prisoners
40. DAVID KEANE, CASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 82–83 (2007).
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 83–84.
43. Luke 12:49.
44. Steve Rempe, A Proposal for Change, PRISON FELLOWSHIP,
https://www.prisonfellowship.org/2016/01/charles-colson-task-force-on-federalcorrections/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
45. Id.
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his death in 2012, was one of America’s foremost Christian leaders
as well as its most effective advocate for criminal justice reform.
Colson, whose championing of liberty was not limited to prisons,
put the historic Christian position well: “it is crucial that the
church be engaged politically—not to exercise power but to protect
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms.” 46
Having surveyed church history, I will now respond to one of
the most common accusations currently heard against
Christianity’s historic influence on public policy. The argument,
often associated with Nietzsche and other secular elements of the
political right, is that Christian morality—with its transcendent
valuation of human dignity—in fact gave rise to the most naïve
excesses of the Enlightenment, and so led to the bloody
totalitarianism of the 20th century. That this is nearly the opposite
of the argument made by secular devotees of Casas is
unsurprising: as Chesterton once observed, it has often seemed as
if “any stick was good enough to beat Christianity with.” 47
The Nietzschean narrative has become so common that I have
even heard some Christians grudgingly acknowledge, as an
unpleasant fact beyond dispute, that Marxism is an illegitimate
child of the Christian faith. Nothing could be further from the
truth. In the first place, one should note that each of the historical
examples discussed above amounted to a restraint on
governmental power, not an assertion of it. More fundamentally,
however, Christianity—unlike Marxism—has never known a
concept of equality as good in and of itself. 48
Helping others is, of course, central to the Christian life—“as
you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to
me.” 49 Yet this duty to care for others in no way suggests that
uniformity of position or role is desirable. Chesterton, as usual, put
the matter most succinctly:
That all men should live in equally beautiful houses is a dream
that may or may not be attained. But that all men should live
in the same beautiful house is not a dream at all; it is a
nightmare. That a man should love all old women is an ideal
46.
47.
48.
49.

CHARLES COLSON, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING 191 (2011).
CHESTERTON, supra note 22, at 122–23.
See infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
Matthew 25:45.
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that may not be attainable. But that a man should regard all
old women exactly as he regards his mother is not only an
unattainable ideal, but an ideal which ought not to be
attained. 50

Far from prizing egalitarianism in the modern, Marxist sense,
Christianity upholds variety of position and role as a thing of
intrinsic value. Paul writes that “there is one body, but it has many
parts . . . If the whole body were an eye, how could it hear? If the
whole body were an ear, how could it smell?” 51 It is variety that
gives rise to the beauty of complementarity, and so it is variety—
and not the deadening sameness of totalitarianism—that reflects
the nature of a fundamentally relational God. The New Testament
makes this apparent in, among other areas, its picture of marriage:
“For the husband is the head of the wife even as Christ is the head
of the church, his body, and is himself its savior . . . Husbands, love
your wives as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for
her.” 52 In this way, the complementarity of the Christian social
order models the interpersonal aspect of God.
The
Nietzschean
argument also reflects an
ignorance of totalitarianism’s
development.
Historically,
totalitarianism emerged less
as a distortion of Christianity
than as a conscious inversion
of it. As a definite ideology,
Western totalitarianism was
not conceived until the
Renaissance. It was then
The Jacobins drowned thousands of Christian
carried to term by thinkers
men and women in the Loire. Jean-Baptiste
like Thomas Hobbes, who—
Carrier, who oversaw the executions, said “Never
at the same time—began to
have I had so much amusement as in seeing the
conspicuously shuffle God
last grimaces of priests as they die.”
out of political philosophy.
Once its gestation was complete, totalitarian power burst suddenly
onto the plane of history, fully formed, in the guise of the
50.
51.
52.

CHESTERTON, supra note 22, at 174.
1 Corinthians 12:12-17.
Ephesians 5:23-25.
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Jacobins—who quickly repaid their supposed debt to Christianity
by publicly drowning clergy in the Loire. 53
This timing is not a coincidence. If the Christian church had
been capable of producing totalitarianism under its own power, it
had over a thousand years to do so. As soon as the literati of Europe
had rejected classical and medieval Christianity, however, the
omnipotent state was elevated to the status of a quasi-Christ—or,
from the Christian perspective, an anti-Christ. In Chesterton’s
words, “once abolish the God, and the government becomes the
God.” 54
III. Religious and Secular Political Morality
Thus far, I have argued that Christianity has had a broadly
constructive influence on Western politics and, additionally, has
not been harmful in some of the ways commonly alleged. Reaching
still further back to first principles of political morality, I will now
go on the offensive against those who would urge that “religion has
no place in politics,” as if this were a neutral axiom of all civilized
society. 55 I will argue that this maxim is either incoherent, or else
it is an expression of arbitrary bias against religion.
53. Thomas Woods, Episode 12—The Anti-Catholic Atrocities that History
Forgot, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: BUILDER OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bILhhHCK-4 (last visited Sept. 6, 2018).
Note that, while Woods’ lecture is a good introduction to the Drownings at Nantes,
its title is somewhat misleading. These state-sanctioned murders were part of a
French campaign to exterminate Christianity in general—known as
“dechristianization”—that ultimately led to the creation of an atheistic “Cult of
Reason.” La fête de l'Être suprême (1794), ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AGE OF POLITICAL
REVOLUTIONS AND NEW IDEOLOGIES 1760–1815 237 (2007).
54. G. K. CHESTERTON, CHRISTENDOM IN DUBLIN Ch. III (1932).
55. See, e.g., Teresa Wiltz, “Oh Lord, Can’t We Keep Religion Out of Politics?”,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
14,
2013,
12:43
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/14/keep-religion-outpolitics (“Religion has no place in politics—and it certainly has no place in the US
supreme court. Religion, or the lack thereof, is such a deeply, deeply personal
thing.”); Cf. Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics, N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.html (last visited July 22, 2018)
(“[S]ecularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the
door before entering into the public square.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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First, consider an example I gave during the panel discussion
following Professor Calhoun’s talk. I favor a government of strictly
limited powers, in part, because I believe in the Christian doctrine
of Original Sin. Because human beings are predisposed to evil,
political power will inevitably be abused, and should be
restricted. 56 If one insists, in response, that “religion has no place
in politics,” what exactly would this mean?
One possible interpretation might be simply that, whether or
not I am warranted in believing in Original Sin, I should not derive
a political conclusion from a religious belief. The first problem with
this assertion, of course, is that it would be nonsense. It is not
logically possible to sincerely hold a belief while mentally
cordoning it off from the rest of one’s mind. Doing so would be like
believing yourself to be a skilled public speaker, but not concluding
that you are actually capable of giving an effective speech. This
makes the statement that “religion has no place in politics” a
meaningless cacophony of words. If it expresses anything at all, it
is a demand that religious people adopt a sort of compulsory
schizophrenia.
The second problem with this assertion is that it suggests that
some beliefs, although warranted, must never be the basis of any
practical conclusions. The absurdity of this suggestion is, if
possible, even more obvious. No one would assert that a warranted
belief that immunotherapy will cure cancer, that one’s beverage is
poisoned, or that a bridge on the road ahead has collapsed, cannot
be the basis of any practical change in behavior. Mental
separationism, as we have interpreted it, therefore appears to
inexplicably quarantine some warranted beliefs—especially those
concerning the origin of the universe and human existence, their
purpose and destiny, and our essential condition—as “religious”
and therefore disfavored.
This brings us to a second possible interpretation: that mental
separationism is simply an assertion that all religious beliefs are
false; in other words, an assertion of atheism or agnosticism. In
one sense, of course, it is logical for any atheist to support this kind
of separationism. I myself hold an equivalent position: I believe
that atheism is a false belief, that false beliefs should not inform
56. This teaching is made clear in, among other places, Judges 9:8-15 and 1
Samuel 8.
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public policy, and that atheism should therefore not inform public
policy. Any atheist would argue that religion should not inform
public policy for the same reasons. In a more important sense,
however, this interpretation makes all modern talk of a “wall of
separation” an extravagant dishonesty. 57 It would be bizarre to
present my belief that atheism is false as a mutual “wall of
separation” between atheism and the state—when, in fact, I wish
to detach atheism from politics for the very reason that I think
nobody should be an atheist in the first place.
Insofar as this interpretation is what separationists actually
mean, then phrases like “religion has no place in politics” are
nothing more than devices to willfully obscure their true position—
and they should be identified as such. 58 Theists are happy to assert
our own position straightforwardly; we resist atheistic arguments
in politics because we have concluded that atheism is not true. If
atheists are to discourse with religious believers, then they should
adopt the same candor—and should not attempt to frontload the
discussion with tricks.
Whatever they mean,
seperationists clearly do not
assert that no moral premises
can inform politics. As
Professor Calhoun noted,
then-Senator Obama made
this point well in 2006: “To
say that men and women
should not inject their
‘personal morality’ into public
Then-Senator Barack Obama delivering his 2006 policy debates is a practical
“Call to Renewal” speech.
absurdity. Our law is by
definition a codification of morality. . . .” 59 Anyone who publicly
advocates laws against murder, in other words, is assuming some
approximation of the moral belief that murder is wrong.
57. See Calhoun, supra note 3, at 465 (discussing the “wall of separation”
and crediting Thomas Jefferson for this metaphor).
58. Wiltz, supra note 55.
59. Barack Obama, Obama’s 2006 Speech on Faith and Politics, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/28/us/politics/2006obamaspeech.
html (last visited July 22, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Secularists who seek to categorically exclude religious
premises from politics, then, are asserting that, when they use
moral premises to promote certain policies, these premises stand
on stronger ground than religious ones. Although there is not space
here for a comprehensive apologetic for Christian morality, I will
conclude this response by arguing that secularists are no more
justified in using their own moral premises in policy arguments
than are religious believers. No secular account of political
morality—neither a quasi-morality of personal taste, nor a
Platonic belief in nontheistic moral realism—can provide premises
which are more tenable than theistic ones. This means that mental
separationism expresses, not only a bias against religious belief,
but an arbitrary bias.
Of course, it is conceivable to punish murderers and other
criminals, for example, without any coherent justification at all.
One could act in the world while remaining silent, or simply refuse
to provide a justification—perhaps by announcing that you are
doing the things you want to do. This was essentially the course
chosen by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a nihilist who rejected
the existence of moral values and duties.
Although Justice Holmes might seem to have expressed moral
positions, he clearly explained that these were actually nothing
more than expressions of his personal taste. “I can’t help preferring
port to ditch-water, but I see no grounds for supposing that the
cosmos shares my weakness,” he said. 60 Holmes equated moral
problems with the question “Do you like sugar in your coffee or
don’t you? . . . So as to truth.” 61 Or, more explicitly:
The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as me; but I kill
it if I get the chance, as also mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers,
and flies. My only judgment is that they are incongruous with
the world I want; the kind of world we all try to make according
to our power. 62

Holmes was quite willing to grant that he had no justification
for executing a murderer. The murderer’s preference for murder
60. Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions: Arthur Leff's Still
Irrefutable, But Incomplete, "Sez Who?" Critique, 20 J.L. & RELIGION 31, 40 n.70
(2004–2005).
61. Id.
62. Id.

CHURCH HISTORY, LIBERTY & POLITICAL MORALITY 561
really carries no less authority than Holmes’ own preference for
killing him—except that people with these two preferences
sometimes differ in raw power. If murderers were to become
judges, then non-murderers could be executed with the same
authority.
While either kind of execution is possible, neither Holmes nor
a pro-murder judge would have any basis for using his personal
tastes as a premise in a public policy argument. A robber may well
feel that he is justified in robbing others at gunpoint by the fact
that he wants to do so. But—as the robber impliedly recognizes by
brandishing a weapon—this fact can no more support a conclusion
about what other people ought to do than can the hooting of an
orangutan.
Nihilists in the vein of Justice Holmes often argue that many
persons share certain broad, primary tastes, and that most moral
reasoning can be replaced with discussions about how best we
might jointly realize these primary tastes. To illustrate this idea,
we might picture an imaginary congress of humanity, at which
someone proposes a motion: “Whereas all of us wish not to be
murdered or raped, be it resolved that none of us shall murder or
rape.” Putting the glaring impracticality of this nebulous concept
to one side, 63 a nihilist’s quasi-moral reasoning would be almost as
63. The most obvious practical difficulty with this concept is that it will do
nothing at all to dissuade someone who would opportunistically commit murder
or rape only when he could confidently do so without consequences for himself.
The history of warfare indicates that this category includes, at minimum, a great
many people—even if willful self-ignorance prevents human beings from
recognizing the fact. In the 1960s, Stanley Milgram measured the human capacity
for evil when he asked subjects to administer increasing electric shocks to another
subject in a nearby room. The other subject—actually an actor—would express
discomfort, scream for the experiment to stop, and finally fall silent and
apparently die. In Milgram’s experiment, 65% of subjects complied fully with the
experiment, eventually administering three 450-volt shocks to an apparently
lifeless body. Yet, when Milgram described his experiment to other people—and
asked them what they would have done—100% of those surveyed claimed they
would have defied the experiment. Cf. MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY 108 (2013). Queasier nihilists often respond to arguments
of this kind with indignant assurances of their own subjective goodness. Penn
Jillette, for example, states “my answer is: I do rape all I want. And the amount
I want is zero. And I do murder all I want, and the amount I want is zero.”
Interview by Ron Bennington with Penn Jillette (Apr. 2012). In this way, their
self-image is based in part on a naïve denial of the fact that human beings are “by
nature children of wrath” and that “nothing good dwells in us, that is, in our
flesh.” Ephesians 2:3; Romans 7:18. Nihilists with sturdier stomachs will concede,

562

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 546 (2018)

politically useless as it is transparently unsatisfying. A friendly
nihilist might at least have some persuasive authority when his
primary tastes are shared by others. But if his countrymen began
to acquire a primary taste for a fatherland populated by
pureblooded Aryans, for example, he could only express
frustration. The kindly nihilist’s best argument would sound
something like: “But my tastes are the tastes that I have.”
To take a more specific example, suppose Justice Holmes’ own
preference for a eugenically pure society, free of “imbeciles,” was
akin to his preference for drinking wine rather than ditch-water. 64
In this case, no one could persuade him to abandon it without first
persuading him to abandon nihilism. A eugenicist holds incorrect
moral premises which must be replaced. Yet a nihilist’s deepest
premises cannot be replaced by any kind of argument, since he
views all moral premises the way he views his taste for black
coffee. The nihilist’s imagined social contract, then, cannot even be
the basis for a quasi-philosophy of ethics that is of any lasting use
in public policy discussions.
Although Holmes’ nihilism
is common among lay atheists, it
is rare among their academic
counterparts. One alternative to
nihilism is found in Plato’s
Forms, which are said to exist
objectively—that is, they are not
mere
preferences—but
are
decidedly not anchored in a
personal God. In the modern
United States, students and
academics
in
philosophy
departments commonly adopt a
Marxist account of
Carrie Buck, left, the plaintiff in Buck v. similar,
nontheistic
moral
realism.
Bell, a landmark case in which Justice
Holmes upheld the forced sterilization of Although it is rare for modern
philosophers to actually use the
those he deemed unfit.
term “Forms” to describe moral
more persuasively, that this consequence of nihilism does not make nihilism
untrue.
64. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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duties, a Marxist sees these duties as transcending human
preferences while also having a non-personal source. The idea of a
Platonic Form is both the best and the only conceivable way to
describe this source. 65
In the first place, we should note that the modern
philosopher’s rejection of God now carries with it a curious
arbitrariness. Modern proponents of the Forms deny God’s
existence—presumably because they feel there is insufficient
evidence that God exists—yet have no trouble believing that our
moral duties come from an invisible metaphysical cloud. It has now
become so common for philosophers to be both atheists and moral
realists that Christian philosophers rarely criticize their secular
colleagues for this apparent hypocrisy—perhaps because atheistic
Platonism had acquired an “Emperor’s new clothes” aura of
academic respectability.
The arbitrariness of Platonic atheism poses further problems.
First, even if the Forms existed, there is no reason to think that
humans could correctly perceive them. The Christian philosopher
Alvin Plantinga has noted that, if our brains have come into being
without God or anything like him, then we have very little reason
to think that we have correct beliefs. 66 For any given situation,
thousands of false belief-desire combinations might move our body
parts in the ways required for us to survive and reproduce. In fact,
if humans have no transcendent minds, then our consciousness is
merely a side-effect of the machinery of our brains: our beliefs may
be irrelevant to our actions and not adaptive at all.
Again, even supposing we could perceive impersonal Forms,
why is it that these abstractions happen to correspond to human
beings? Without some kind of theism, it is an accident that humans
exist at all. We are, as the philosopher Democritus thought,
collocations of atoms in a void. It would be suspiciously convenient
if transcendent Forms were waiting all along to provide moral
duties to accidental collections of particles. For the theist, this
65. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 189 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 2d
ed., 1991) (“the good isn’t being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity
and power.”).
66. Alvin Plantinga, An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism,
REASONS FOR GOD, http://www.reasonsforgod.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/AnEvolutionary-Argument-Against-Naturalism.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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problem vanishes: God-ordained duties correspond to us because
God created us. In the words of Yale law professor and nihilist
Arthur Leff, “A God-grounded system has no analogues. Either
God exists or He does not, but if He does not, nothing and no one
else can take His place.” 67
Nor, I submit, has any force in history exercised so beneficial
an influence on public policy as Christianity. Christianity can be
“known by its own fruit” 68—fruit which warrants experimentally
trying Christianity, “that by testing you may discern what is the
will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.” 69 Even if I
have not revealed anything in Christianity that is intriguing,
however, I hope at least to have suggested the outline of a
worldview which merits intellectual regard—one which is capable
of speaking productively to public policy and which cannot, in all
fairness, be barred from doing so.

67.
68.
69.

Calhoun, supra note 60, at 36.
Luke 6:44.
Romans 12:2.

